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INTRODUCTION

Since the 1980s, the United States has experienced a re-emergence
of racist and anti-Semitic activity., White Supremacist organizations
such as Aryan Nations advocate violence against minorities.2 Even
teenagers are joining the violent neo-Nazi movement as racist
skinheads.3 This activity has resulted in a sharp increase in the number
of hate-related attacks on minorities, especially African-Americans and
Jews.4 The alarming increase in hate-related violence prompted one
organization, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith (ADL), to
propose a possible remedy to the problem.5
The ADL drafted model legislation which would enhance criminal
offenses committed "by reason of the actual or perceived race, color,
religion, national origin or sexual orientation of another individual or
group of individuals."6 Although the ADL entitled the proposed statute
"Intimidation, ' ' 7 observers have commonly referred to the laws as "hate
crime laws."'8 As many as twenty-two states have adopted statutes
based on the ADL's "Intimidation" model.9 Other states have developed their own statutes designed to punish hate crimes.10 In 1989,

1. See Laurent Belsie, The Face of Hatred in America, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov.
27, 1991, at 8; see also Carol J. Castaneda, Hate Crimes and Killings Are on the Rise, USA
TODAY, Sept. 6, 1991, at A3 (describing the recent increase in violence against minorities).
2. See Is the Ku Klux Klan Poised for a Comeback?, JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 2, 1991
(availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, J. Post File) (alleging the "Christian Identity" movement
has refocused the Ku Klux Klan's hatred primarily toward Jews).
3. See John Leo, A Chilling Wave of Racism; From L.A. to Boston, the Skinheads Are
on the March, TIME, Jan. 25, 1988, at 57; Cheryl Sullivan, White Supremacists; Neo-Nazi Drive
to Recruit U.S. Youth Has Some Success Among "Skinheads", CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Aug. 14, 1987, at 3.
4. See Belsie, supra note 1. In 1990, the number of hate-related murders in the United
States nearly tripled from the year before. Id. Anti-Semitic incidents also rose in 1990 to a
record number of 1685. Id.; see Barbara A. Serrano, Statistics Show Apparent Rise in Hate
Crimes - Many Incidents Go Unreported, Says Civil Rights Activist, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan.
10, 1991, at Al (noting a recent increase in hate crimes in the Seattle area).
5. See Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, but Can Words Increase
Your Sentence? Constitutionaland Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic IntimidationLaws, 39 UCLA
L. REV. 333, 339 (1991).
6. Id. at 344.
7. Id.
8. See Brief of Appellee at 7, State v. Stalder (No. 79,924), jurisdiction accepted, 599 So.
2d 1280 (Fla. 1992).
9. See Gellman, supra note 5, at 340.
10. See id. at 340 n.31; see also H.R. OF FLORIDA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM., FINAL
STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT on C.S.IH.B. 1112, at 1 (1989)
[hereinafter HOUSE IMPACT STATEMENT] (stating that several states have hate bias crime laws).
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with the assistance and support of the ADL,11 the Florida Legislature
drafted its own hate crime law.' 2
Despite the Florida Legislature's good intentions, critics have attacked Florida's hate crime law as an unconstitutional restriction on
freedom of expression and thought. The Florida Supreme Court is
currently examining the constitutionality of Florida's hate crime law
in State v. Stalder.13 As of this writing, a decision from the Florida
Supreme Court is still pending. 4 This note questions the constitution-

11. See HOUSE IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 3; Marc L. Fleischauer, Comment,
Teeth for a Paper Tiger: A Proposal to Add Enforceability to Florida's Hate Crime Act, 17
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 697 (1990).
12. See Fleischauer, supra note 11, at 1-2.
13. No. 79,924, jurisdictionaccepted, 599 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 1992). The facts and procedural
history of Sta/dercan be briefly summarized. A Jewish attorney travelled to the home of Richard
Stalder to retrieve property a friend left there. FORT LAUDERDALE POLICE DEP'T, OFFENSE
INCIDENT REPORT, O.R. # 91-057598, at 2 (Apr. 14, 1991). The attorney went to the Stalder
home after Stalder's brother beat up a female friend of the attorney. Id. The woman lost her
earrings in the scuffle, and the attorney went to the Stalder home to retrieve them. Id. When
the attorney arrived, Stalder struck him in the face and told him to leave the property. Id.
The attorney then contacted the police. Id. The police charged Stalder with battery, a first
degree misdemeanor. Id. Five months later, the attorney went to the police to file a supplemental
police report. See FORT LAUDERDALE POLICE DEP'T, SUPPLEMENT TO OFFENSE INCIDENT
REPORT, O.R. # 91-57598, at 1 (Sept. 9, 1991). In the new report, it was alleged that just
prior to the battery, Stadler made such remarks as "What do you want Jew boy[?]" to the
attorney. Id. The supplemental police report laid the predicate for hate crime enhancement as
follows: "[The victim] feels and believes that Mr. Stalder has a mind setting opinion against the
Jewish people. [The victim] therefore feels that this [crime] should be upgraded from a misdemeanor battery to a hate crime which is a third degree felony." Id. at 2. Stalder's charge
was then changed from misdemeanor battery to a hate crime battery, punishable as a felony,
pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 775.085(1)(b) (1991). See Brief of Appellee at 1, State v. Stalder, No.
79,924, jurisdiction accepted, 599 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 1992). Stalder moved to dismiss the felony
charge on the grounds that the hate crime law violated the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article 1, § 4 of the Florida Constitution. See Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss & Memorandum of Law, State v. Stalder, No. 91-018929CF10A (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct.
Apr. 20, 1992), jurisdictionaccepted, 599 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 1992) (No. 79,924). The trial court
judge granted the defendant's motion and declared FLA. STAT. § 775.085 unconstitutional. See
Brief of Appellant at 2-3, State v. Stalder, No. 79,924, jurisdictionaccepted, 559 So. 2d 1280
(Fla. 1992). Florida Attorney General Bob Butterworth appealed the judge's order and publicly
promised to correct this "flat-out wrong" decision. See Hate Crime Law Reversed, NAT'L L.J.,
May 4, 1992, at 6. The Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida then bypassed the appeal to
the Florida Supreme Court as a question of great public importance. Id.
14. Florida's District Courts of Appeal are in conflict over the hate crime statute's constitutionality. Compare Dobbins v. State, 605 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (finding the Florida
hate crime statute constitutional) with Richards v. State, 608 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
(holding that Florida's hate crime statute is void for vagueness).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1992

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 5
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

ality of Florida's hate crime law under the free speech clauses15 of the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution 16 and Article I,
17
Section 4 of the Florida Constitution.
Opposition to hate crime laws does not necessarily stem from a
belief that hate crimes should go unpunished. 18 Acts of hatred committed against minorities are already punished by standard criminal statutes.1 9 Opponents of hate crime laws believe a state should not be
able to add extra penalties to a crime based only on the offender's
motive or prejudicial statements. 20 Advocates of free expression believe it is dangerous to allow the government to add additional criminal
2
liability based only on a criminal's immoral beliefs and expression. '
This note examines the constitutionality of hate crime laws around
the nation, and then analyzes the constitutionality of Florida's hate
crime law, in particular. Part II analyzes the United States Supreme
Court's only decision regarding hate crimes, the controversial case,
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.- Part III examines various state supreme
court decisions regarding the constitutionality of the states' respective
hate crime laws. Part IV recounts the legislative history behind
Florida's hate crime law. In Part V, this note examines the constitutionality of Florida's hate crime law under several analyses, including
R.A.V. Part VI questions whether Florida or any state can enact a
constitutional hate crime law and proposes possible constitutional alternatives. Part VII concludes this note with policy considerations of

15. The free speech clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, § 4 of the Florida Constitution guarantee the same right, absent an expression to the
contrary by the Florida Supreme Court. Florida Canners Ass'n v. State Dep't of Citrus, 371
So. 2d 503, 517 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), affd, 406 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 1981).
16. The First Amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
17. Article I, § 4 reads in relevant part: "Every person may speak, write and publish his
sentiments on all subjects but shall be responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be
passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press ...
" FLA. CONST. art. 1, §
4 (emphasis added).
18. See Gellman, supra note 5, at 342.
19. See, e.g., id. at 363.
20. Id. at 334.
21. See id. at 334. Nadine Strossen, a noted civil libertarian, stated that, "[c]ombating
racial discrimination and protecting free speech should be viewed as mutually reinforcing, rather
than antagonistic, goals." Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest
Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 489.
22. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
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hate crime laws and advocates greater societal response to the origins

of prejudice in this country.
II.

R.A.V. v. CITY OF ST. PAUL

On June 22, 1992, the United States Supreme Court decided its
2
first case dealing with a hate crime law in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul. 3
In R.A.V., the State of Minnesota charged a juvenile defendant with
violating St. Paul, Minnesota's 'Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance" 24
after the defendant burned a cross in an African-American family's

yard.m The ordinance prohibited the display of any symbol which

"arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender. '"
The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
ordinance on the grounds that it reached only 'fighting words," 7 an

unprotected category of speech.m Justice Scalia, writing the majority
opinion for the United States Supreme Court, reversed the ruling of
the Minnesota court, and held that the ordinance was facially invalid

because it prohibited expression based on the content and viewpoint
of that expression.29

23. Id.
24. See id. at 2541 (citing ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
25. Id.
26. Id. The full text of the ordinance reads:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika,
which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits
disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id. (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
27. Id.; see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) ("'Fighting Words'
are of such slight social value.., that any benefit derived from them is clearly outweighed by
social interests of order and morality.").
28. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541.
29. Id. at 2542, 2547. Although the decision to overturn the Minnesota ordinance was
unanimous, not all members of the Court agreed on the grounds for overturning the statute.
See id. at 2541, 2550-71. Justice White, concurring only in judgment, wrote that the statute
was not facially unconstitutional, but "fatally overbroad." Id. at 2550 (White, J., concurring).
Justice White found that the ordinance punished both unprotected expression and expression
protected by the First Amendment. Id. (White, J., concurring). Justice White criticized the
majority for ruling on grounds never presented to the Court and abandoning precedent in
holding as it did. Id. at 2550-51. (White, J., concurring). Justice White argued that the majority
rejected the longstanding "categorical approach," which allowed for "certain discrete categories
of expression to be proscribable on the basis of their content." Id. at 2551-52. (White, J.,
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Justice Scalia asserted that although fighting words are generally
proscribable, some fighting words can be "quite expressive."1 Therefore, the government cannot regulate certain types of fighting words
and leave other types of fighting words free from criminal liability
based only on "hostility - or favoritism - towards the underlying
message expressed." 3' The Court held that the City of St. Paul cannot
prohibit only certain fighting words on the basis of their expressive
content.3 2 Justice Scalia reasoned that if St. Paul could prohibit expression based on the content of certain fighting words, then by analogy,
a city council could regulate obscenity based on whether the obscene
work contains criticism of the city government.A further problem the Court found with the St. Paul ordinance
was what Justice Scalia referred to as "viewpoint discrimination."Under the ordinance, St. Paul could punish persons with certain view-

concurring). These certain categories of speech are proscribable because their "expressive content
is worthless or of de minimus value to society." Id. at 2552. (White, J., concurring). Justice
White contended that "fighting words" are an example of expression that falls into an unprotected
category because they are only intended to "provoke violence or ... inflict injury." Id. at 2553
(White, J., concurring) (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572). "Therefore, a ban on all fighting
words or on a subset of the fighting words category would restrict only the social evil of hate
speech, without creating the danger of driving viewpoints from the marketplace." Id. (White,
J., concurring). Justice White reasoned that Justice Scalia therefore created an "underinclusiveness" doctrine rather than a prohibition on content or viewpoint discrimination. Id. (White, J.,
concurring). Justice White also accused the majority of ignoring the strict scrutiny analysis. Id.
at 2554. (White, J., concurring). Justice White contended that if the St. Paul ordinance was
indeed a content-based restriction it could be justified as a narrowly drawn ordinance necessary
to serve a compelling state interest. Id. (White, J., concurring).
Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion, accused the majority of manipulating First
Amendment doctrine to strike down "an ordinance whose premise it opposed ....
" Id. at
2560-61 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun asserted that the decision weakened traditional protections of speech by seemingly abandoning the categorical approach and relaxing
strict scrutiny's application. Id. at 2560. (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Stevens agreed
with Justice White that the St. Paul ordinance was only overbroad, but also disagreed with the
majority opinion because of the majority's "absolutism." Id. at 2561 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority's "near-absolute ban on content-based regulations"
which disallowed the regulation of fighting words based on subject matter. Id. at 2562 (Stevens,
J., concurring). Justice Stevens objected to the majority's rule that in order to prohibit speech
in a proscribable category, the government must either proscribe all speech in that category,
or no speech at all. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 2543-44.
31. See id. at 2544-45.
32. Id. at 2543-44, 2547-48.
33. Id. at 2543.
34. See id. at 2547.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol44/iss4/5

6

Katz: Speak No Evil, Think No Evil: The Florida Hate Crime Law
THE FLORIDA HATE CRIME LAW

points in a debate, but could not punish persons espousing opposing
viewpoints.35 The city could punish a person under the ordinance only
if the person insulted someone's race, color, creed, religion, or gender.
To illustrate "viewpoint discrimination," Justice Scalia referred to
a hypothetical debate over Catholicism.3 7 According to Justice Scalia's
hypothetical, St. Paul could punish someone who holds a sign reading
"Papists are misbegotten" under the ordinance because the sign insults
others on the basis of their religion.3 However, St. Paul could not
punish an adversary who holds a sign reading "anti-Catholic bigots
are misbegotten" because the sign did not attack anyone on the basis
of religion or any other prohibited category listed in the ordinance.3 9
To attack someone as an "anti-Catholic bigot" does not insult on the
basis of religion. 40 Justice Scalia summarized viewpoint discrimination
by stating, "St. Paul has no such authority to license one side of a
debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis
of Queensbury [sic] Rules."'4 1 The R.A.V. decision all but eliminated
a government's ability to enact content-based hate crime laws, even
if those laws only address the traditionally proscribable category of
fighting words.
III.

OTHER STATES' REACTIONS TO HATE CRIME LAWS

Hate crime statutes vary in form and method of punishment across
the country.42 It is unclear to what extent R.A.V. applies to the many
hate crime statutes which add additional or more severe punishment
to a sentence when prejudice motivates a crime. After the release of
R.A.V., various state supreme courts examined the constitutionality
of the states' respective hate crime statutes. Besides applying R.A.V.,
these courts applied new, insightful analyses to the validity of hate
crime laws in general.

35. See id. at 2547-48.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 2548.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. Id. The "Marquis of Queensberry Rules" are a boxing code of fair play.
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 801 (New College ed. 1981).
42. See Gellman, supra note 5, at 333-34.
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The day after the United States Supreme Court decided R.A.V.,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court overturned its state's hate crime statute
in State v. Mitchell.43 Wisconsin's hate crime law was a penalty enhancer; the state could only invoke the statute after a person committed an underlying criminal act. The statute operated to punish hate
crimes by increasing the penalty normally associated with the underlying crime. 45 The Wisconsin hate crime law enhanced a criminal penalty if the actor "intentionally select[ed]" the victim "because of the
race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or
' 6
ancestry of that person. 1
The Mitchell court reasoned that the selection of the victim already
qualified as an element of the underlying criminal offense, namely the
actor's intent.47 The hate crime statute, therefore, punished the actor's
motive for victim selection.4 The defendant's motive is the reason
why the defendant selected the victim.4 9 The Mitchell court concluded
that by punishing someone's motivation, the state is actually prohibiting bigoted thought. 50 The court then declared that "the constitution
protects all speech and thought, regardless of how offensive it may
be." 51 Because the Wisconsin law criminalized bigoted thought, the
Mitchell court found that the law violated R.A.V. 2 Wisconsin's hate
crime law, like St. Paul's ordinance, singled out and punished certain
ideological content.
Two months after R.A.V. and Mitchell, the Ohio Supreme Court
found its state's hate crime law unconstitutional in State v. Wyant.5
The Ohio law was called an "Ethnic Intimidation" statute, similar to
the ADL model legislation.- The Ohio Intimidation statute enhanced

43. 485 N.W.2d 807, 808 (Wis.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 810 (1992). As of this writing,
no decision has been reached by the United States Supreme Court regarding Mitchell.
44. Id. at 809 n.1.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 812.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 811 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)).
52. Id. at 815.
53. Id.
54. 597 N.E.2d 450 (Ohio 1992), petitionfor cert. filed, 61 U.S.L.W. 3303 (U.S. Sept. 29,
1992) (No. 92-568).
55. Compare id. at 452 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.12 (Baldwin 1990)) with
Gellman, supra note 5, at 344 (quoting ADL model intimidation statute).
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offenses when they were committed "by reason of the race, color,
religion, or national origin of another person or group of persons."
In overturning the Ohio statute, the Wyant court further developed
the distinction between motive and intent:
"Intent" refers to the actor's state of mind or volition at the
time he acts. Did A intend to kill B when A's car hit B's,
or was it an accident? This is not the same as A's motive,
which is why A intentionally killed B. When A murders B
in order to obtain B's money, A's intent is to hill and the
motive is to get money.5 7
The Ohio high court held that by criminalizing the actor's motive, the
state punishes the actor's thought, not the criminal act or intent.
The Wyant court asserted that although neither its state's constitution
nor the United States Constitution explicitly prohibits the state from
punishing thought, 59 the First Amendment protects freedom of thought
as well as freedom of speech. ° The court supported this contention
by quoting the United States Supreme Court's decision in Abood v.
6 ' "At the heart of the First Amendment
Detroit Board of Education:
is the notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will,
and that in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind
''
and his conscience rather than coerced by the State. 62
The Wyant court also distinguished the Ohio hate crime law from
state and federal civil rights laws which protect minorities from discrimination in employment, housing, and education.6 The court recognized that civil rights laws punish the act of discrimination, not the
motivation behind the act.r4 Several commentators agree that civil
rights laws target discriminatory behavior, not prejudicial thought 5

56.

Wyant, 597 N.E.2d at 453.

57.

Id. at 454.

58. Id. The Wyant court noted that motive is not an element of a crime and is substantively
irrelevant to a determination of guilt. Id. at 453-54. Procedurally, however, motive may be used
as eukince of guilt, and good motive may result in leniency at the sentencing phase. Id. at 453.
59. Both constitutions explicitly protect freedom of expression. See U.S. CONST. amend.
I; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 11.
60. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d at 456.
61. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
62. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d at 456-57 (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 234-35).

63. Id. at 456.
64. Id.
65. See Gelman, supra note 5, at 367-68.
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One scholar notes: "Just as bigotry can exist without being acted upon,
discrimination can occur without racist motivation. It is the discriminatory action, and not the racial motive, that Congress intended to
prohibit in those statutes."For example, under a "disparate impact" theory of employment
discrimination,67 a court may hold liable an employer whose hiring
practices appear facially neutral if those practices still disproportionately disadvantage a minority group.6 Title VII does not require a
plaintiff to prove that the employer acted out of prejudice in order to
hold the employer liable for discrimination.6 9 As noted by the Wyant
court, the United States Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
stated: "Congress directed the thrust of the [Civil Rights] Act to the
' '7
consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation. 0
However, not all state supreme courts agreed with the findings of
the Wisconsin and Ohio supreme courts. The day after Wyant was
decided, the Oregon Supreme Court filed State v. Plowman.71 The
Plowman court reversed the trend of Mitchell and Wyant and declared
Oregon's ethnic intimidation statute constitutional.- The Oregon statute made it a crime for two or more persons, acting together,7 to
"intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause physical injury to
another because of their perception of that person's race, color, religion, national origin or sexual orientation." 4
The Plowman court held that the Oregon intimidation statute does
not proscribe opinion or speech.7 The court reasoned that a hate crime
can be committed "without speaking a word, and holding no opinion
other than their perception of the victim's characteristics. 7 6 Moreover,

66. Id. at 368.
67. This action would be brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2 (1988).
68. See Wyant, 597 N.E.2d at 456 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971));
Gellman, supra note 5, at 368.
69. See Wyant, 597 N.E.2d at 456. However, at least one commentator has suggested that
the rule of Mitchell (and presumably Wyant) would find Title VII disparate treatment causes
of action unconstitutional. See James Weinstein, First Amendment Challenges to Hate Crime
Legislation: Where's the Speech?, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1992, at 6, 14.
70. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d at 456 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432).
71. 838 P.2d 558 (Or. 1992).
72. Id. at 565-66.
73. It is interesting that the Oregon Intimidation statute, unlike most others, requires two
or more assailants. Id. at 563 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 166.165(1) (1991)).
74. OR. REV. STAT. § 166.165(l)(a)(A) (1991).
75. Plowman, 838 P.2d at 563-64.
76. Id. at 563.
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the Plowman court found the law to proscribe a "forbidden effect.""
The "forbidden effect," as articulated by the Oregon high court, was
"the effect of acting together to cause physical injury to a victim whom
the assailants have targeted because of their perception that that
victim belongs to a particular group."78
To further demonstrate that the Oregon statute does not proscribe
"communication," the Plowman court offered the following hypothetical:
[I]f the state showed that every Saturday night for two
months the defendants traveled to an area with a large Hispanic population and assaulted a Hispanic person, the trier
of fact could infer that the defendants intended to cause
physical injury to the present victim because he is perceived
to be Hispanic.' 9
The Plowman court's hypothetical suggests that a plaintiff can use
a "disparate impact" theory to prove a hate crime under the Oregon
statute. However, what if the assailants in the hypothetical were a
purse-snatching team who had a habit of knocking down elderly women
as they stole the women's purses? What if the Hispanic neighborhood
lacked adequate police protection, making it more attractive to criminals? In the latter situation, should it be inferred that the defendants
intended to cause injury to the victims because they were Hispanic?
The above questions demonstrate the major flaw of the Plowman
court's reasoning: the court failed to recognize that the language "because of' in the Oregon statute directly implicates the actors' motivation.8" The Oregon statute addresses the actors' intent by requiring
that the actors "intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause physical
injury to another."'s However, the statute also addresses the actors'
motivation by stating that they must act "because of their perception
of that person's race, color, religion, national origin or sexual orienta-

77.

Id.

78. Id.
79. Id. at 564.
80. See Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at, 812 (recognizing that the Wisconsin hate crime statute
"punishes the 'because of aspect of the defendant's selection ...the motive behind the selection");
see also Wyant, 597 N.E.2d at 454 (recognizing that the Ohio hate crime statute punished
motive); Gellman, supra note 5, at 364-68 (arguing that motive cannot be a criminal offense).
81. See Plowman, 838 P.2d at 560, 563 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 166.165(1)(a)(A) (1991)
(emphasis added)).
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tion. '" 1 According to the Mitchell and Wyant courts, as well as several
commentators, an actor's motive should not be an element of a crime,
3
nor should a law directly punish someone's motive.
The Plowman court also ruled that R.A.V. did not apply to the
Oregon intimidation statute because the Oregon statute only targeted
conduct, not expression. The Plowman court also addressed Mitchell,
stating simply that the court disagreed with Mitchell's reasoning.
As demonstrated in Mitchell, ethnic intimidation laws address only
the actor's thought and expression, because the state's criminal code
already punishes criminal conduct and intent.1 Thus, by reasoning
that the Oregon intimidation statute only punishes conduct, the Plowman court incorrectly avoided applying the R.A.V. ruling.
IV.

LEGISLATIVE

HISTORY

775.085:

OF

FLORIDA STATUTES
FLORIDA'S HATE CRIME LAW

SECTION

After strong lobbying by the ADL, the Florida Legislature drafted
and passed a hate crime law in 1989. According to Florida legislative
committee documents, the legislature originally intended the law to
"provide for enhanced punishment for the commission of a criminal
act when the motive for that act is based on a person's race, religion
or national origin."' The statute drafted by the legislature enhanced

82.

OR. REV. STAT. § 166.165(1)(a)(A) (1991) (emphasis added).
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR.,
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 318 (1986)); see Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 814; Gellman, supra
note 5, at 364; Martin B. Margulies, Intent, Motive, and the R.A.V. Decision, CRIM. JUST.
ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1992, at 42, 45.
However, the doctrine that an actor's motive cannot be criminalized has been criticized as
"[a] common clich6," "irrational," "evil," and "purely semantic." See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Bias
Crimes: What Do Haters Deserve?, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1992, at 20, 22. In
response to the charge that the distinction between motive and intent is "purely semantic,"
Susan Gellman stated: "Differences of statutory language are not insignificant semantic matters.
Words are, after all, the only tool of the law." Susan Gellman, "Brother,You Can't Go to Jail
for What You're Thinking": Motives, Effects, and "Hate Crime" Laws, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS,
Summer/Fall 1992, at 24, 25.
84. Plowman, 838 P.2d at 565.
85. Id. The court also distinguished Mitchell on the grounds that the Oregon statute required
two or more actors and the Wisconsin statute only required one. Id. However, the Plowman
court did not explain why that distinction was relevant to the statute's constitutionality. See id.
86. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 812 (quoting Gellman, supra note 5, at 363).
87. See Fleischauer, supra note 11, at 697; see also Florida Hate Crime Law, 1989 Fla.
Laws ch. 89-133 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 775.085 (1989)).

83. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d at 453 (citing 1

88.

FLORIDA SENATE STAFF ANALYSIS & ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT ON S.B. 1210,

at 1 (1989) [hereinafter SENATE IMPACT STATEMENT].
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a criminal offense 89 when the commission of the crime "evidences prejudice." 9 For the statute to apply, a defendant must commit an underlying criminal act. 91 If the commission of the underlying criminal act
evidences prejudice, the hate crime statute is invoked, and the statute's enhancement scheme increases the level of the crime one degree
higher than the legislature originally mandated in the Florida Criminal
Code.9 At the time the law was written, eighteen other states used
93
a similar penalty enhancement scheme in their hate crime statutes.
Florida's hate crime law became effective on October 1, 1989.9
95
The law, which also contained a provision for civil treble damages,
was codified at Florida Statutes section 775.085 as follows:
(1) The penalty for any felony or misdemeanor shall be reclassified as provided in this subsection if the commission of
such felony or misdemeanor evidences prejudice based on
the race, color, ancestry, ethnicity, religion, or national origin of the victim:
(a) A misdemeanor of the second degree shall be punishable as if it were a misdemeanor of the first degree.
(b) A misdemeanor of the first degree shall be punishable
as if it were a felony of the third degree.
(c) A felony of the third degree shall be punishable as if
it were a felony of the second degree.
(d) A felony of the second degree shall be punishable as
if it were a felony of the first degree.9

89. See id.; FLA. STAT. § 775.085(1) (1989). At the time, Florida had several criminal
provisions that increased a crime's penalty when the crime was committed under specified
circumstances. See FLA. STAT. §§ 775.0845, .087, 784.08 (1989).
90. See FLA. STAT. § 775.085(1) (1989).
91. See id.; SENATE IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 88, at 1.
92. See FLA. STAT. § 775.085(1) (1989).
93. SENATE IMPACT STATEMENT, 8upra note 88, at 2.
94. Florida Hate Crime Law, 1989 Fla. Laws ch. 89-133 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 775.085
(1989)).
95. FLA. STAT. § 775.085(2) (1989). The provision for civil treble damages reads as follows:
(2) A person or organization which establishes by clear and convincing evidence
that it has been coerced, intimidated, or threatened in violation of this section shall
have a civil cause of action for treble damages, an injunction, or any other appropriate relief in law or in equity. Upon prevailing in such civil action, the plaintiff
may recover reasonable attorney's fees and costs.
Id.
96. FLA. STAT. § 775.085(1) (1989) (amended 1991).
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In 1991, the legislature amended the statute to include sexual orientation as a category of prohibited prejudice. 97 During the legislative
debate on the amendment, a senator proposed adding "sex" as another
category of prohibited prejudice.98 However, the Florida Senate rejected this addition, leaving gender-based prejudice unpunishable by
the statute. 99
V.

ANALYSIS OF FLORIDA'S HATE CRIME LAW

A.

A Plain Reading of the Statute

A plain reading of the Florida statute reveals that it enhances the
penalty of a crime if the commission of that crime "evidences prejudice."'o Though legislative analysts professed the need for a hate
crime law which would enhance crimes motivated by prejudice, 1°1
Florida legislators chose to draft the law with an "evidences prejudice"
standard. 10 2 Determining the meaning of this standard is of primary
importance in analyzing the statute. 10 3
Black's Law Dictionary does not define "evidences," which is the
verb form of the noun, "evidence. "104 However, the Oxford American

97. The new category was inserted between "religion" and "national origin." See FLA. STAT.
§ 775.085(1) (1991). Along with the addition of "sexual orientation" to the protected categories
of prejudice, an additional provision was added to the statute: "(3) It shall be an essential
element of this section that the record reflect that the defendant perceived, knew, or had
reasonable grounds to know or perceive that the victim was within the class delineated herein."
FLA. STAT. § 775.085(3) (1991).
98.

See FLORIDA

SENATE, JOURNAL OF THE SENATE,

Apr. 25, 1991, at 1033 (S.B. 1482,

amendment of Sen. Bruner). During debate on the floor of the Florida Senate, one senator
criticized the proposed addition of "sex" as follows:
Senators, I think that we are getting to the place where we are going from the
ridiculous to the sublime. Inasmuch as you only have two basic sexes, and that's
male and female .... I think we need to leave this Bill clean without this amendment, because if you put this amendment on, I can assure you, you're 'gonna run
into very serious trouble and the courts are' gonna be clogged with trying to defend
that it was done because of the person's sex.
Brief of Amicus Curiae, Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers at 6, State v. Stalder,
No. 79,924, jurisdiction accepted, 559 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 1992).
99. See FLORIDA SENATE, supra note 98.
100. See FLA. STAT. § 775.085(1) (1991).
101. See HOUSE IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 1; SENATE IMPACT STATEMENT,
supra note 88, at 1.
102. See FLA. STAT. § 775.085(1) (1991).
103. It should be noted that the language "evidences prejudice" has resulted in a Florida
appellate court ruling that the statute is unconstitutionally void for vagueness. See Richards v.
State, 608 So. 2d 917 (1992).
104. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 555 (6th ed. 1990).
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Dictionary indicates that the verb form of "evidence" means "[t]o
indicate, to be evidence of.

'10 5

Florida's hate crime law, therefore,

enhances criminal liability when the actor indicates or shows evidence
of prejudice. This standard differs from standards utilized by almost
all other hate crime laws which generally require prejudicial motivation.1o6
The following hypothetical illustrates the distinction between mere
evidence of prejudice and prejudicial motivation: A hits B because B
is dating A's ex-girlfriend. During A's rage, he emits a slew of insults
aimed at B. A directed one of his insults at B's Hispanic background.
Under this hypothetical, A's motivation in attacking B was jealousy.
A's motivation was not based on B's Hispanic background. However,
A's attack on B did evidence prejudice based on race. Therefore, A
could be guilty of a hate crime under a plain reading of Florida's
statute. This result is at odds with even the ADL's concept of what
constitutes a hate crime. 10 7 The ADL defines a hate crime as an act
which is motivated by bias or prejudice.'08
Furthermore, how does a person evidence prejudice? Prejudice,
racial or otherwise, is a preconceived, unreasonable opinion.19 A person's opinions can be evidenced only by expression. Because a person
who "evidences prejudice" ultimately is expressing himself or herself,
the Florida hate crime law overtly punishes expression.
B. Applying R.A.V. to the Florida Hate Crime Law
In Dobbins v. State, 0 the Fifth District Court of Appeal of Florida
held that R.A.V. does not render the Florida hate crime law unconstitutional because the statute punishes the act of discrimination, not
the content of speech."' According to the Dobbins court, Florida's hate
crime law does not punish expression of opinion, but rather, it punishes
a person who acts on his or her opinion.1 2 The Dobbins court further
stated, 'We concede, as we must, that the defendant's motive is im-

105. OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 221 (1980).
106. See Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 812; Gellman, supra note 5, at 343.
107. See SENATE IMPACT STATEMENT, supra note 88, at 2.
108. See id.
109. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1033 (New College ed. 1981). Prejudice is
defined as "[ain adverse judgment or opinion formed beforehand or without knowledge or
examination of the facts." Id. (emphasis added).
110. 605 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).
111. Id. at 923.
112. Id. at 924.
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plicated in this issue. But that does not mean that the prohibited
''
conduct is not subject to regulation. 113
The Dobbins court is correct in asserting that the "prohibited conduct" is subject to regulation.114 However, in Dobbins, Florida's battery statute punished the prohibited conduct in question.115 Additionally, the actor's discrimination, or selection of a particular victim,
served as evidence of the actor's intent, which also was an element
of the underlying battery charge.116 Thus, Florida's hate crime law
only adds additional penalties for what it says it punishes: indications
of prejudice. As discussed previously, prejudice can only be indicated
by a person's expression.117
Florida's hate crime law, like the Minnesota ordinance overturned
in R.A.V., punishes expression based on the content of that expression, because the Florida statute only punishes expression which contains prejudice. Additionally, Florida's statute does not punish all types
of prejudice expressed during the commission of the crime; the statute
only punishes prejudice based on "race, color, ancestry, ethnicity,
religion, sexual orientation, or national origin."' 8 For instance, no
penalty enhancement occurs if the commission of a crime evidences
prejudice based on gender or disability.119 According to the majority
in R.A.V., the government cannot punish expression "based on hostility - or favoritism - towards the underlying message expressed"
even if the expression of prejudice falls under the proscribable category
of fighting words. 2°
In its practical operation, the Florida hate crime law also suffers
from what Justice Scalia called "viewpoint discrimination."'' " The statute can punish one side of a debate, albeit an altercation, and leave
the other viewpoint free from criminal liability.' 22 The following
hypothetical demonstrates how the Florida hate crime law can result

113. Id. (footnote omitted).
114. See Gellman, supra note 5, at 363.
115. See FLA. STAT. § 784.03(1)(a) (1991).
116. See Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 812; Gellman, supra note 5, at 363.
117. See supra text accompanying note 110.
118. FLA. STAT. § 775.085(1) (1991).
119. See id.
120. See R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2545.
121. See id. at 2547-48; supra text accompanying notes 35-42.
122. See R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547-48. Justice Scalia drew the same conclusion about the
Minnesota ordinance. Id. However, the Minnesota ordinance did not require that any criminal
act accompany the expression. See id. at 2541 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02
(1990)).
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in viewpoint discrimination: An oral confrontation in a Florida city
between a group of racist skinheads and a group of African-Americans
escalates into a physical fight between the two groups. It is unclear
who started the altercation. The police arrive and charge members of
both groups with battery. Pursuant to the Florida hate crime law,
the police could charge the skinheads with a felony because their
battery evidenced prejudice based on race.m However, the AfricanAmericans would probably be charged only with standard misdemeanor battery because their actions would not likely be considered
to evidence prejudice based on race or any other prohibited category.
The African-Americans in the above hypothetical would not be
considered prejudiced against the skinheads based on race; rather,
the African-Americans would be considered prejudiced against the
skinhead's ideology. Prejudice based on ideology is not punishable
under Florida's statute.'m Therefore, the skinheads' prejudice would
be punished while the African-Americans would escape prosecution
under the hate crime law. However, R.A.V. does not permit the State
of Florida to impose criminal liability on the thought and expression
of one side of a debate, and leave the other side free from the additional
sanction.'? Though the skinhead's philosophy is abhorrent, R.A.V.
holds that the state cannot favor one viewpoint in a debate over
another.
C.

Can the State of FloridaPunish a Criminal'sMotivation?

Though the plain language of the Florida hate crime law indicates
that the statute enhances penalties when the actor "evidences prejudice,"' proponents of the law contend that a motivation requirement
can be "read into" the statute.m In Dobbins, the Fifth District Court
of Appeal read the plain language of the statute to require that the
crime be motivated by prejudice.m The Dobbins court asserted that
a mere indication of prejudice, such as a racial slur uttered during
the crime, would not qualify as a hate crime under the Florida stat-

123. See FLA. STAT. § 775.085(1)(b) (1991). Battery, a first degree misdemeanor, is enhanced
to a third degree felony under the Florida hate crime law. Id.
124. See supra text accompanying note 118.
125. See R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547-48.
126. Id. at 2548.
127. FLA. STAT. § 775.085(1) (1991).
128. See Dobbins, 605 So. 2d at 922.
129. Id. at 923.
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ute. 30 According to the court, "the statute requires that it is the
commission of the crime that must evidence the prejudice; the fact
that racial prejudice may be exhibited during the commission of the
crime is itself insufficient.' 131
Even if the Dobbins court is correct in stating that courts may
construe Florida's hate crime law to require prejudicial motivation,
the statute can still be challenged on the grounds that it criminalizes
an actor's motivation. 132 The Mitchell and Wyant cases, as well as the
opinions of various legal scholars, support the view that a statute
cannot make an actor's motivation an element of a crime or a penalty
enhancement criterion.13
Criminal law often makes other thought-related concepts, such as
the actor's intent and purpose, elements of a crime or penalty enhancement criteria. 1 Professor Susan Gellman has explained the distinction
between motive, purpose and intent as follows:
"Intent" . . . refers to the actor's mental state as it determines culpability based on volition, "purpose" connotes what
the actor plans as a result of the conduct . . . , and "motive"
is the term for the actor's underlying, propelling reasons for
acting, which may have no direct relationship to the type of
conduct chosen. 1'
The actor's intent, or mental state regarding culpability, can serve
as an element of an offense to show what the actor has done. 136 For
example, the actors intent distinguishes a deliberate act from an accidental occurrence.137 The actor's purpose is also relevant to what the
actor has done.'- To illustrate: Burglary is defined as the act of entering a building "with purpose to commit a crime therein."' 39 If a person
breaks into a house to retrieve his or her own property, the police

130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d at 453-54; Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 812-13; Gellman, supra note 5,
at 363-68.
133. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d at 453-54; Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 812-13; WAYNE R. LAFAVE &
AUSTIN W. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 227 (2d ed. 1986); Gellman, supra note 5, at 364. But see
Murphy, supra note 83.
134. Gellman, supra note 5, at 364.
135. Id. at 364-65.
136. See id. at 367.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 366.
139. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 197 (6th ed. 1990).
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may charge that person with breaking and entering or trespass. 140
However, the police could not charge the person with burglary because
the purpose of the break-in was to take property already owned by
the actor.14 ' A person does not have a criminal purpose when retrieving
his or her own property.'4 On the other hand, an actor's motive is
simply the actor's reason for acting.14 Motive is relevant to why the
actor engaged in the conduct, as opposed to purpose and intent, which
are relevant to what the actor has done.-' In the above hypothetical,
if the actor took a blender from the house he broke into, the actor's
motive might have been a desire to mix drinks.
Criminal laws punish what an actor does, not why the actor takes
action. 45 Criminalizing motive14 creates a "thought crime," which in
effect punishes an actor's underlying thoughts, reasons, and in the
case of hate crimes, opinions.1 7 Under the Florida Criminal Code,
offenses such as battery, assault, and murder punish what an actor
does, regardless of the actor's motive.' 4 Therefore, if, as the Dobbins
court suggests, Florida's hate crime law only adds enhanced punishment to already existing crimes based on the actor's motivation,14 the
statute is an unconstitutional infringement of freedom of thought and
opinion under the First Amendment.
D.

Is the FloridaHate Crime Law a Penalty Enhancement or
Sentence Enhancement Statute? Does it Matter?

The ADL and other groups have defended the constitutionality of
Florida's hate crime law by asserting that the statute does not create
a new, substantive crime, but rather adds punishment to an existing
crime at the sentencing phase.15° To support this view, the ADL has

140. See Gellman, supra note 5, at 365.
141.
142.
143.

See id.
See id.
Id. at 364.

144. Id.
145. See id. at 364-68. According to Professor Lafave, "[M]otive ... is not relevant on the
substantive side of the criminal law." LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 133, at 227.
146. If an actor's motive can be criminalized, a state could even enhance penalties for civil

disobedience. For example, a state could enhance penalties for crimes such as trespass, when
those crimes are motivated by hatred for governmental policies.
147. See Gellman, supra note 5, at 364-68.
148. See FLA. STAT. §§ 782.04, 784.03, .011 (1991); see also Gellman, supra note 5, at 366
n.155 (pointing out that the Model Penal Code does not consider motive relevant).
149. See Dobbins, 605 So. 2d at 923.

150. Brief for Amicus Curiae, Anti-Defamation League, American Jewish Congress, and
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pointed to a number of Florida statutes with a penalty enhancement
scheme similar to the hate crime law.15'
Of the statutes listed by the ADL, the one most similar in enhancement scheme to the hate crime law is the Florida statute which enhances penalties when the defendant wears a mask during the commission of the crime. 152 The "mask" statute, like the hate crime statute,
states that the crime "shall be punishable as if it were" a crime of
the next higher degree.10 The ADL contends that statutes such as
the "mask" statute do not change the level of offense, but only operate
to reclassify the punishment scheme at the sentencing phase of a
trial. 1
However, in Jennings v. State, 155 the First District Court of Appeal
of Florida held that the "mask" statute enhances the primary offense
of a crime, not the punishment post-conviction.156 Therefore, under
the identical enhancement scheme of the Florida hate crime statute,
battery, a first degree misdemeanor offense, is reclassified as a third

International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists (American Section) at 10, 12, State v.
Stalder, No. 79,924, jurisdictionaccepted, 599 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 1992) [hereinafter ADL Brief].
151. See id. at 11-12. The other statutes mentioned by the ADL enhance penalties when
the defendant wears a mask, the defendant possesses a firearm during a felony, the victim is
a law enforcement officer, the victim is elderly, or the victim of battery is pregnant. See FLA.
STAT. §§ 775.0823, .0845, .087, 784.045(1)(b), .08 (1991).
152. See FLA. STAT. § 775.0845. The "mask" statute reads as follows, in pertinent part:
The penalty for any criminal offense ... shall be increased as provided in this
section if, while committing the offense, the offender was wearing a hood, mask,
or other device that concealed his identity.
(1) A misdemeanor of the second degree shall be punishable as if it were a
misdemeanor of the first degree.
(2) A misdemeanor of the first degree shall be punishable as if it were a felony
of the third degree.
(3) A felony of the third degree shall be punishable as if it were a felony of
the second degree.
(4) A felony of the second degree shall be punishable as if it were a felony of
the first degree.
Id.
153. Compare id. (enhancing the penalty for committing a criminal offense if the offense
is committed while wearing a mask) with FLA. STAT.§ 775.085 (1991) (enhancing the penalty
for committing a criminal offense if the offense evidences prejudice).
154. See ADL Brief, supra note 150, at 12.
155. 498 So. 2d 1373 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
156. Id. at 1374. The Jennings court contrasted the mask statute, FLA. STAT.§ 775.0845,
a penalty enhancement statute, with the habitual offender statute, FLA. STAT. § 775.084, which
increases a defendant's sentence post conviction in terms of years. Id.
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degree felony offense. 157 Thus, in its practical operation, Florida's hate

crime law creates a new criminal offense. 158
The Jennings case demonstrates that Florida's hate crime statute
does not operate as a sentence enhancement statute. 159 However, even
if the legislature had drafted the hate crime law as a sentencing statute, courts could not consider prejudice, racial or otherwise, as an
aggravating factor to increase a sentence.160The ADL, however, contends that courts can use racial prejudice as a sentencing factor, and
relies on the United States Supreme Court cases Barclay v. Florida6'
and Dawson v. Delaware62 to support its contention. 163 Yet any good
faith belief that Barclay and Dawson support an aggravating sentencing factor of "racial prejudice" results from a misreading of those two
cases.'"
In Barclay, the United States Supreme Court upheld a death sentence where the trial judge considered evidence of the defendant's
racial hatred in determining his sentence.ca The defendant in Barclay
was a member of a militant racist group which advocated the indiscriminate killing of white people and the beginning of a racial war. 16
However, racial prejudice itself was not an aggravating factor in
Barclay; rather, the judge considered the defendant's militant racist
views as evidence to support other aggravatingfactors.167 Those aggravating factors were: the "great risk of death to many persons,"
the disruption of 'the lawful exercise of any governmental function or
the enforcement of the laws," and the murder being "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel."'

The Dawson case also supports the conclusion that while racial
prejudice itself cannot be an aggravating factor in sentencing, a court
can consider evidence of racial prejudice to support a distinct aggravat157. See FLA. STAT. § 775.085 (1991).
158. The State of Florida, in its Stalder brief, concedes that the hate crime law "creates
a new substantive crime." Brief of Appellant, supra note 13, at 14.
159. Jennings, 498 So. 2d at 1373.
160. See Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 809 n.1, 817. The Mitchell opinion supports the conclusion
that prejudice or bias cannot be used as an aggravating factor in sentencing because the Wisconsin
statute at issue in that case increased the actor's sentence in addition to reclassifying the offense.
Id.
161. 463 U.S. 939 (1983).
162. 112 S.Ct. 1093 (1992).
163. See ADL Brief, supra note 150, at 18-19.
164. See Gellman, supra note 83, at 25-26.
165. Barclay, 463 U.S. at 949.
166. Id. at 942. The group was called the Black Liberation Army. Id.
167. Id. at 949.
168. Id. at 949 n.7.
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ing factor such as "future danger to society.
States Supreme Court explained:

[Vol. 44

' 16 9

In Dawson, the United

In many cases, for example, associational evidence might
serve a legitimate purpose in showing that a defendant represents a future danger to society. A defendant's membership in an organization that endorses the killing of any identifiable group, for example, might be relevant to a jury's
inquiry into whether the defendant will be dangerous in the
future. 170
The Dawson Court held that presenting evidence of the defendant's
"abstract" beliefs to show that the defendant's beliefs are "morally
reprehensible" is improper even at sentencing. 171 To support this finding, the Court reiterated its holding in Texas v. Johnson:1 2 "The
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea offensive or disagreeable."1 73 Although judges
have a wide degree of discretion in determining aggravating factors
for sentencing, courts may not consider the defendant's opinions and
beliefs when determining such factors.174
VI.

IS IT POSSIBLE TO DRAFT A CONSTITUTIONAL HATE
CRIME LAW?

Section V examined the constitutionality of Florida's hate crime
law on many levels and under various analyses. Subsection V(A) demonstrated how the plain language of the statute, taken literally, violates the constitutional right to freedom of expression. 75 Subsection
V(B) applied the rule of R.A.V. to Florida's hate crime law and
reasoned that the law violates R.A.V. by prohibiting thought and
expression based on content.1 76 The next subsection, V(C), showed
that no precedent exists in criminal jurisprudence which would allow
the state to criminalize an actor's motive, and that any attempt to
criminalize motive violates the constitutional right to freedom of

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at 1098.
Id. at 1098.
Id.
491 U.S. 397 (1989).
Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at 1098 (quoting Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414).
See id.

175. See supra text accompanying notes 100-09.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 110-26.
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thought and opinion. 177 The final subsection, V(D), asserted that it is
unconstitutional for a court to consider a convicted defendant's racial
8
prejudice as an aggravating factor in sentencingy1
The question which logically follows is: Can the State of Florida,
or any state, draft a hate crime law which does not violate the First
Amendment? The Committee on Judiciary of the Florida House of
Representatives proposed a redraft of Florida's hate crime law during
the 1992 legislative session.179 The proposal read as follows:
The penalty for any felony or misdemeanor shall be reclassified as provided in this subsection if the commission of
such felony or misdemeanor by the defendant is proven
beyond a reasonable doubt to have been motivated, in whole
or in part, by the defendant's specific intent to commit such
act because of the victim's race, color, ancestry, ethnicity,
religion, sexual orientation or national origin. 18°
Though the judiciary committee's proposal removed the language
"evidences prejudice," the proposal was flawed. The proposal overtly
punishes the actor's motive, which as discussed above, violates First
Amendment interests. 181 Additionally, the proposal violates the R.A.V.
holding because it categorizes specific types of prohibited prejudice
and leaves other types of prejudice unpunished, thereby resulting in
content and viewpoint discrimination.' A close reading of the proposal
also reveals an ambiguity as to whether the defendant must have a
specific intent to be motivated, or must be motivated by specific intent
to commit the act.' 83 Either way, the language makes little sense.
Perhaps the only constitutional way to punish hate crimes is to
move the focus of the statute away from the motive or opinion of the
offender. A statute proposed to Congress by Professor Susan Gellman
and Jill Stone's, would enhance criminal penalties based on the actor's

177. See supra text accompanying notes 127-49.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 150-74.
179. See FLORIDA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HOUSE CoImm.AMEND. TO H.B. 75-H,
amend. no. 2, Special Sess. H (June 2, 1992).
180. Id.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 127-49.
182. See R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547-48.
183. See FLORIDA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supa note 179. It is important to point
out that the language "because of" in the proposal implicates the defendant's motivation. See
Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d at 812.
184. This alternative approach to hate crime legislation, developed by Professor Susan
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intent to create a harmful social effect, not the actor's motive for
committing the act. 18 Proponents of Florida's hate crime law argue
that such laws are justified because of the greater social harms of
hate-related crime. 18 The Gellman/Stone proposal would punish an
actor's intent to cause those harms.18
Under the proposal, courts would enhance a crime to a more serious
offense when the court finds that the defendant acted "with specific
intent to create terror within a community."' s The law would not
refer to the actor's particular biases or prejudices, thereby avoiding
criminalization of opinion. s9 Additionally, the proposed law would
punish the actor's intent, not the actor's motive.19° The drafters of this
proposal assert that the new law must be a separate criminal statute,
not merely a sentencing factor.' 9' This is important because the
Gellman/Stone proposed statute requires that the state prove the element of specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt to the trier of fact.'
Once the state has proven the requisite intent to create terror in the
community, the court would enhance the level of the offense.193

Gellman and Jill Stone, Legislative Liason of the Ohio Public Defenders Commission, was
presented to Congress in regard to H.R. 4797 (1992), advising the Congress on the constitutionality of a proposed Federal hate crime law. See Letter from Susan Gellman, Assistant Public
Defender, Ohio Public Defender Commission, Adjunct Professor, Capital University Law School,
to Daniel E. Katz (Oct. 22, 1992) (on file with author).
185. Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act of 1992: Hearing on H.R. 4797 Before the
Subcomm. on Crime and CriminalJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. 51 (1992) [hereinafter Hearings] (prepared statement of Susan Gellman, Assistant
Public Defender, Ohio Public Defenders Commission, and Adjunct Professor, Capital University
Law School).
186. ADL Brief, supra note 150, at 7. The ADL asserted in its Stalder brief:
Florida, as has other states, recognizes the harmful effects which result when
individuals are victimized because of their status, such as race, ethnicity or religion.
The resulting harm to society can be greater than the harm caused by the injurious
conduct alone, since entire classes of people are put at risk.
Id. (emphasis added).
187. Hearings, supra note 185, at 52.
188. Id.
189. See id.
190. See id. One commentator has suggested that an intent-based hate crime statute would
not only be constitutional, but better tailored to fight the evil of hate crimes than a motive-based
statute. See Margulies, supra note 83, at 43-44.
191. Hearings, supra note 185, at 52-53.
192. Id. at 53.
193. Id.
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In its practical application, the statute would be versatile; courts
could use the law not only to punish hate crimes, but also to punish
other criminal acts which cause great fear in communities: drive-by
shootings, the poisoning of over-the-counter medications, or the vandalization of health-care clinics.94 The "community" mentioned in the
statute can refer to, inter alia, an ethnic community, a religious community, or a geographic community. 195
Although the Gellman/Stone proposal answers many First Amendment concerns, flaws nevertheless exist. The proposal's versatility
may be an obstacle to its adoption. Some legislators may be hesitant
to enact a measure which courts can use to punish anti-abortion rights
demonstrators who deface or destroy women's health care clinics. Additionally, in practical operation courts may inconsistently define "terror" and "community."
Despite these concerns, the Gellman/Stone proposal may be the
best mechanism available to increase the punishment for hate crimes.
Not only does the proposal disregard an offender's thought and expression, it also punishes all types of hate crimes. The proposed statute
does not enumerate certain specific categories of "hate."'1 Therefore,
the legislature will not have to bear the burden of choosing to protect
only certain groups under the statute, while leaving other groups open
to hate-related attacks.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The goal of Florida's hate crime law is certainly noble. Crimes
committed against people because of their membership in certain
minority groups are truly reprehensible. However, unless the legislature carefully drafts a hate crime law which avoids the punishment
of thought and expression, Florida's current hate crime law will eventually cause greater evil than the legislature sought to prevent. For
example, Florida law enforcement officers have applied the hate crime
law to oppress persons whom the legislature meant for the law to
protect. On at least two occasions, African-American residents of
Florida have been charged with a hate crime for calling a white police
officer a "cracker."' According to Professor Gellman, such a result

194. Id. at 52.
195.

Id.

196. See supra text accompanying notes 188-93.
197. See Gellman, supra note 5, at 361, n.134 (citing Hate-Crime Charge Dropped Against
Black Man in Florida, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 31, 1991, at 10); Fred Grimm, 'Cracker'Was Salty
Remark, Not Criminal, MLiAi HERALD, Feb. 11, 1992, at B4.
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raises the "possibility of the statute's vindictive application to young
members of disempowered groups who had been annoying majority
group member police officers . .. . s
Hate crime laws are not the only weapons available to combat
prejudicial hatred. Society can take affirmative steps to combat prejudicial thought before resorting to criminal sanction. Educators should
be mandated to teach young children the value of all human beings
and expose the moral flaws of prejudice. Political candidates must
cease to exacerbate racial and religious hatred in their campaign appeals and instead project a unifying message. 199 Only through further
expression and competing thought can society remedy the ill of prejudice. Poorly constructed legislative band-aids, such as Florida's hate
crime law, only hamper that effort by covering up the bruises society
should take the responsibility to cure.
Daniel E. Katz
198. Gellman, supra note 5, at 361; see also Strossen, supra note 21, at 556-58 (stating
that hate crime laws in other countries have been used to oppress minorities).
199. See Christine Chinlund, Campaign88; Bush Defends Against 'Grossly Unfair'Racism
Charge, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 4, 1988, at 17; Tom Teepen, Buchanan's Record of Anti-Semitism,
STAR TRIBUNE, Feb. 25, 1992, at A9.
"Author's Note: As this note went to press, the United States Supreme Court
decided Wisconsin v. Mitchell, No. 92-515, 1993 WL 195271 (U.S. June 11, 1993),
rev'g 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis. 1992). The Court reversed the Wisconsin Supreme Court
ruling discussed in this note. Id. at *3; see supra notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
However, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Mitchell does not affect the
constitutional status of Florida's hate crime law.
In Mitchell, the United States Supreme Court held that Wisconsin's hate crime
sentence enhancement law did not violate the First Amendment. Mitchell, 1993 WL
195271, at *2. Although the State of Wisconsin argued that the Wisconsin law punished
only conduct, the Court found that the Wisconsin hate crime law did punish motive.
Id. at *4. After conceding that the Wisconsin law enhanced sentences based on
motivation, the Mitchell Court explained that trial judges have a great deal of discretion in determining sentences, stating that an offender's motive can be taken into
consideration at sentencing. Id. However, the Mitchell Court explained that this
discretion has limitations: "[I]t is equally true that a defendant's abstract beliefs,
however obnoxious to most people, may not be taken into consideration by a sentencing
judge." Id. (citing Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992)). Despite this limitation,
the Mitchell Court held that Wisconsin can enhance the sentences for certain offenses
when the offender is motivated by prejudice or bias, because under Barclay v. Florida,
463 U.S. 939 (1983), and Dawson, evidence of racial hatred may be admitted at
sentencing to prove aggravating factors. Id. at *5. (Curiously, the Supreme Court's
holding seemed to obscure the rulings of Barclay and Dawson, which allow racial
prejudice as evidence of other aggravating factors, but not as an aggravating factor
itself. See supra notes 165-74 and accompanying text.)
Still, the Supreme Court's opinion in Mitchell does not affect the constitutional
status of Florida's hate crime law. Florida's hate crime law can be distinguished from
the Wisconsin statute on two different grounds. First, the Florida statute, on its
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face, overtly punishes expression, regardless of the offender's motive. See supra notes
100-08 and accompanying text. Unlike Wisconsin's enhancement criteria, which focused
on the offender's motive, Florida's hate crime law enhances offenses when the commission of a criminal act "evidences prejudice" - a standard that makes no reference
to the offender's underlying motive, and directly implicates the offender's expression.
See supra notes 100-08 and accompanying text.
Second, unlike the Wisconsin law, which the Mitchell Court construed as a sentence
enhancement statute, Florida's hate crime law operates to enhance the offense committed, not merely the sentence post-conviction. See supra notes 150-59 and accompanying text. The Mitchell Court only ruled that motive can be used for enhancement
at the sentencing stage in a criminal proceeding. See Mitchell, 1993 WL 195271, at
*7. Therefore, the Mitchell decision does not apply to the Florida hate crime law
because the Florida hate crime law punishes expression, not only motive. See supra
notes 100-08 and accompanying text. Moreover, even if the Florida statute were
construed to criminalize only motive, it creates an entirely new crime; it does not
merely enhance a sentence post conviction. See supra notes 150-59 and accompanying
text. Thus, the Florida hate crime law's distinguishing characteristics were not addressed by the Mitchell Court, and therefore, the Mitchell opinion does not apply to
the Florida statute.
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